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1 Introduction 
With the advance in technology, wireless sensor networks 
(WSNs) performing sensing and communication tasks will 
be widely deployed in the near future because they greatly 
extend our ability to monitor and control the physical 
environment and improve the accuracy of our information 
gathering (Estrin et al., 2002; Hu et al., 2003; Kahn et al., 
2000; Reif and Wang, 1999; Sibley et al., 2002). Sensor 
nodes can be deployed in inhospitable physical environment 
such as battlefields, remote geographic regions, and toxic 
urban locations. And now, sensors can be tiny and mobile as 
they can be a group of mobile robotic insects sensing 
dangerous areas or enemy targets and sending back as much 
information as possible (Wood, 2007). 
In WSNs, power in sensors is the scarcest resource. In 
many situations, sensors cannot get recharged very often 
after being deployed in the field. Therefore, power efficient 
communication mechanisms are desired. As mobility 
becomes readily available to sensors (Rodoplu and Meng, 
1999), recent studies on using mobility as a control 
mechanism to minimise energy consumption (Goldenberg  
et al., 2004; Jiang et al., 2007; Li and Halpern, 2001;  
Wang et al., 2005, 2007) have been conducted. Several 
mobility control protocols have been developed in which 
mobile sensors are controlled to move to the most power 
efficient positions for communication. These studies show 
that the saved energy in communication can compensate for 
the energy consumption in movement. Thereby, the overall 
energy consumption of sensors is reduced. These protocols 
also ensure that the communication among sensors will not 
be disrupted when sensors are moving to their best 
locations. 
However, we observe that the existing protocols 
converge slowly, i.e., it takes many rounds for the sensors to 
move to their optimal locations because a sensor node 
adjusts its position according to the positions of its  
two neighbours. Thus, a lot of energy is wasted in 
movement. To address this problem, we propose two new 
mobility control protocols that can converge quickly while 
keeping all the advantages of the existing protocols. The 
mobility control protocol with quick convergence (MCC) 
speeds up the convergence process by avoiding the 
overreaction of a node to the movement of its neighbours, 
while the mobility control protocol with fast convergence 
(MCF) reduces the convergence time by moving the nodes 
as close to their optimal positions as possible. The key idea 
of our protocols is to use the optimal location information of 
each relay node calculated by algorithm mobility control 
with minimum total moving distance (MCM) as a guide for 
mobility control. Experimental results show that this 
information allows the mobility control process to converge 
quickly. The idea of MCM is put forward in Goldenberg et 
al. (2004). It is a lightweight algorithm that can be carried 
out along with any routing protocol by simply appending a 
counter and the location information of the source and the 
destination to the routing messages. 
Furthermore, the existing mobility control protocols do 
not consider any security issue. In particular, the security of 
the sink node has never been discussed. The sink node in a 
WSN is crucial for gathering, aggregating, transferring and 
processing sensor information. If a sink node is located and 
destroyed, the network covered by the destroyed sink node 
will not function. Although we notice that some existing 
security schemes for WSNs can be used to prevent packets 
from being eavesdropped or modified (Karlof et al., 2004; 
Drissi and Gu, 2006) and to secure credentials used in 
mobility control (Eschenauer and Gligor, 2002; Zhu et al., 
2003), the current mobility control protocols are risk free for 
attackers to obtain the sink location information, because 
mobility control protocols yield the location information of 
the sink node to mobile sensors. Attackers can compromise 
some nearby nodes to obtain sink location. Such attacks can 
be launched by attackers anywhere, even far away, from the 
sink node without exposing the attackers themselves. 
Therefore, protecting the location of the sink node is one of 
the critical security issues to safeguard WSN operations. 
Thereby, we identify this issue as sink location privacy 
which is defined as hiding the location of the sink node. 
However, the sink location information can be hardly 
protected using existing security mechanisms. At the same 
time, a scheme for sink protection should not affect normal 
sensing, communication and mobility control tasks that 
require the knowledge of the sink location. To address this 
privacy issue, we propose a novel privacy-preserving 
scheme, called sink-anonymity scheme (SAS) that only 
discloses the location information of dummy sinks and hides 
the real sink in a Φ-anonymity area to deceive attackers. 
The contributions of the paper are four-fold. First, our 
mobility control protocols MCC and MCF converge much 
faster and reach nearly optimal results, compared with the 
existing mobility control protocols. Second, our protocols 
are fully distributed in that they use only one hop 
neighbourhood information, and they are proved to maintain 
the connections between a node and its neighbours. Third, 
the privacy of the sink location is a unique issue in mobility 
control. It has not been given much attention in the sensor 
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network research field. Most security and privacy related 
research focuses on secure routing, key management, source 
privacy and denial of service. Fourth, the SAS is the first 
work to address the sink location privacy issue in mobility 
control. The scheme does not disclose the sink location, or 
any information to help attackers derive the sink location. 
We show that it has Φ-anonymity on the sink location and 
can be readily integrated into existing mobility control 
protocols to enhance their security. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 
summarises existing mobility control protocols and related 
privacy issues in WSNs. Section 3 provides the preliminary 
information on mobility control. Section 4 presents  
two novel mobility control protocols with fast convergence. 
Section 5 describes the privacy-preserving scheme and 
proves its Φ-anonymity on the sink location. Section 6 
shows how to apply the privacy scheme in the current 
mobility control protocols. Section 7 presents the results of 
simulation and analysis on performance. Finally, Section 8 
concludes the paper. 
2 Related works 
2.1 Mobility control 
Power-efficient topology control and routing protocols 
(Perkins, 2000; Royer and Toh, 1999) have been well 
studied in the past years. A few recent studies (Goldenberg 
et al., 2004; Jiang et al., 2007; Li and Halpern, 2001; Wang 
et al., 2005, 2007) have showed the feasibility of using 
mobility as a control primitive to minimise power/energy 
consumption in networks of mobile sensors. In Goldenberg 
et al. (2004), the authors prove that in a single active flow 
between a source and a destination pair, if the energy cost 
function is a non-decreasing convex function, the optimal 
positions of the relay nodes must lie entirely on the line 
between the source and destination, and that the relay nodes 
must be evenly spaced along the line. Based on this, despite 
the randomness of the initial deployment, if nodes can move 
toward their optimal locations under mobility control, the 
energy consumption in communication can be minimised. 
Following the work, a few mobility control protocols 
have been proposed and implemented. Synchronous and 
asynchronous mobility control algorithms (Goldenberg  
et al., 2004) let relay nodes reach their optimal locations 
based on the averaging algorithm (Jadbabaie et al., 2003; 
Rao et al., 2003). In brief, each node’s optimal location is 
the average of its left and right neighbours’ locations. The 
left and right neighbours of a node refer to the left and right 
neighbours on the line between the source and the 
destination. Thus, a node moves along with the movement 
of its two neighbours. The algorithms are simple: they only 
require one hop local information to be exchanged between 
a node and its left and right neighbours, and are distributed, 
which is suitable for a mobile environment. Also, the 
authors prove that the movement of a node in this way will 
not break the connections between the node and its 
neighbours. However, Jiang et al. (2007) find a problem in 
the algorithms: nodes may oscillate around their optimal 
locations and deplete their energy. A solution using a 
predefined threshold δ is provided (Jiang et al., 2007) to 
address the problem so that nodes will stop moving when 
the distance between the node’s current location and the 
next location is no greater than the threshold. 
As discussed before, these protocols do not make nodes 
move quickly to their optimal locations. Instead, many 
rounds of movement are needed for them to reach their final 
locations. Such slow convergence is a negative factor to 
justify the effectiveness of the mobility control primitive in 
power-efficient communication. Our protocols will address 
this critical issue. 
2.2 Privacy 
Privacy research was mainly conducted in the context of 
information privacy and anonymisation. For example, a 
packet or a traffic pattern should not disclose identity 
information. Anonymous communication is one of the main 
research topics (Reed et al., 1998; Chaum, 1981). In this 
type of communication, a series of intermediate systems 
(mixes) are deployed. Each mix accepts messages from 
multiple sources, performs one or more transformations on 
them, and then forwards them in a random order. This 
method can hide the source and destination addresses in IP 
routing when being deployed in the internet. However,  
it is not suitable in mobility control, because location 
information is not identity information. 
A few schemes (Xi et al., 2006; Mehta et al., 2007; 
Kamat et al., 2005) have been proposed on source location 
privacy in sensor networks. Their defence objective is to 
protect the object that is being monitored by sensors. 
Because the object being monitored is usually around the 
source nodes that are sending information back, attackers 
can locate the object by locating the source nodes. Hence, 
their schemes are focused on how to hide the locations of 
the source nodes. The main ideas of these schemes can be 
summarised as follows: 
1 each source node floods packets through numerous 
paths to the base station to make it difficult for an 
adversary to trace the source 
2 each real source node is associated with a few other 
(real or fake) source nodes so that they all generate 
packets at the same time to confuse attackers 
3 a source node sends a packet in a looping path that goes 
through the base station so that attackers will get lost in 
it 
4 all source nodes periodically send back packets 
regardless of whether they are monitoring the object or 
not 
5 a set of virtual objects are put in the field to simulate 
the behaviour of the real object so as to hide it. 
In this paper, we are interested in sink location privacy. 
Because the sink node in a sensor network is crucial for 
gathering, aggregating and transferring sensor information, 
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if the location of the sink node is disclosed and the sink is 
destroyed, the functionality of a sensor network can be 
sabotaged. The problem of sink location privacy in mobility 
control is apparently different from the source location 
privacy in that the sink node is usually the destination of 
routes in WSNs. We cannot simply use fake sink nodes 
distributed in the network to hide the real sink location, 
because all packets need to reach the real sink node. Even if 
fake sink nodes can forward packets to the real sink node, 
attackers can still try to locate the sink node by locating the 
fake sink nodes first. Hence, new schemes are needed to 
ensure the privacy of the sink node in mobility control 
protocols. 
3 Preliminary 
In this section, we introduce the background of mobility 
control protocols. 
3.1 Assumptions 
We assume that all sensor nodes have the same transmission 
range R. If two sensor nodes are within each other’s 
transmission range, they can communicate directly and they 
are called neighbours. Otherwise, they have to rely on 
intermediate nodes to relay messages for them. We define a 
WSN as a graph G = (V, E), where V is the set of all sensor 
nodes and E is the set of all edges between pairs of sensor 
nodes. If two sensor nodes can communicate directly, there 
is an edge between them in G. The location of each node u 
is (xu, yu), simply denoted as L(u). |L(u) – L(v)| is the 
physical distance between two nodes u and v. ( )L u′  denotes 
the target location of u in its movement and L*(u) is the 
optimal location of u. 
We assume neighbours can share their location 
information by exchanging short messages. Location 
information can be discovered by GPS or some GPS-free 
positioning algorithms such as the one in Capkun et al. 
(2001). To simplify the discussion, we describe the 
protocols in a synchronous, round-based system, where each 
mobility control message is sent and received in the same 
round. All the protocols presented in the paper can be 
extended to an asynchronous system. However, to make our 
protocols clear, we do not pursue the relaxation. 
We assume that a path from the source s to the 
destination d has already been discovered using a routing 
protocol, e.g., a greedy routing protocol or one of the ad hoc 
routing protocols. We also assume that both s and d are not 
moving during the process. Otherwise, the path is always 
broken and a new routing path needs to be established. 
3.2 Mobility control 
Denote the location of the source s as L(s), the location of 
the destination d as L(d), and the intermediate relay nodes as 
ui for i ∈ [1, n – 1]. Accordingly, u0 is source s and un is 
destination d. According to Goldenberg et al. (2004), the 
optimal location L*(ui) of ui can be calculated as 
( ) ( ) ( )( )i L d L sL u L s i n∗
−= + ×  (1) 
Algorithm MCM (Goldenberg et al., 2004): Mobility control 
with minimum total moving distance. 
1: The source node s sends L(s) and its label 0 to u1. When 
each relay node ui receives L(s) and the label i – 1, it will 
pass L(s) and its own label i to the succeeding node along 
the path. Such a propagation will end at d. 
2: Once L(s) is received at the destination node d, d sends a 
message carrying L(d) back to s along the path. 
3: At each relay node ui, once both L(s) and L(d) are 
received, set ( ) ( ) ( )( )i L d L sL u L s i n∗
−= + ×  and move ui 
to L*(ui). 
The details of the algorithm are presented in  
Algorithm MCM here. Algorithm MCM has a very nice 
property: the total moving distance of nodes in MCM is 
minimum because each node can move to its optimal 
location in one hop. However, this can create a problem: the 
movement can break the connections between a node ui  
and its neighbours. For example, suppose nine nodes  
u0, u1, ⋅⋅⋅, u8 are aligned in a line (see Figure 1). Node u0 is 
the source and u8 is the destination. The transmission range 
of each node is 10. Node ui (i ∈ [0..4]) is at location i.  
Node u5 is at location 14, node u6 is at 23, node u7 is at 32 
and node u8 is at location 41. According to Algorithm 
MCM, the optimal location of relay node ui should be  
L*(ui) = 0 + (41 – 0) = 8 ∗ i. Therefore, the optimal location 
of node u5 (denoted as 5 )L
∗  is 25.625. If node u4 is still at its 
old location 4 when node u5 moves to its optimal location, 
the connection between them is lost. When neighbours are 
disconnected, the data sent is lost and has to be resent from 
the source after timeout. The neighbours have to reconnect 
through sending each other Hello messages. As indicated in 
Cortes et al. (2004), Mao and Wu (2005), and Poduri  
and Sukhatme (2004), all of these will decrease the 
communication efficiency. 
Figure 1 Broken link between u4 and u5 in MCM 
5UU0 U1 U2 U3 U4 6 7 U8
0 1 2 3 4 14 23 32 4125.625
U U
5L
*
 
To address the disconnection problem, a distributed 
algorithm that allows the relay nodes to move to their 
optimal positions is introduced as shown in Algorithm MCD 
(Goldenberg et al., 2004). The key ingredient of this 
algorithm is the simple average calculation. A relay  
node always only moves toward the average of its  
two neighbours, instead of reaching its optimal location in 
one round. Value g in the algorithm is a damping factor that 
prevents a node from overacting to the movement of its  
two neighbours. It is proved (Goldenberg et al., 2004) that 
the connection between communicating neighbours using 
MCD will not be broken. 
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Algorithm MCD (Goldenberg et al., 2004): Mobility control at 
each relay node ui. 
1: Exchange L(ui) with ui–1 and ui+1. 
2: Receive L(ui−1) and L(ui+1). Set 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 .
2
i i
i
L u L u
L u − +
+′ =  
3: Set damping factor g a random value ∈ (0, 1], move 
toward ( ) ( ) ( )( ).i i iL u g L u L u′+ × −  
4 Fast convergence mobility control protocols 
In this section, we first describe our motivation to develop 
fast convergence mobility control protocols by pointing out 
the problems of MCD and then propose two mobility 
control protocols, MCC and MCF, to let nodes move to their 
optimal locations much more quickly. 
4.1 Oscillation and slow convergence of MCD 
Although Algorithm MCD can make nodes move to their 
optimal locations, it suffers from oscillation and slow 
convergence problems as explained in the following 
example. 
In Table 1, there are six nodes, including the source and 
the destination. The transmission range of each node is 10. 
Suppose they are placed in a line and the y coordinate of 
each node is the same. Therefore, in the table, only the x 
coordinate of each node is shown. Round 0 displays the 
initial location of each node. Starting from round 1, each 
relay node uses MCD (suppose g is set to 1) to calculate its 
optimal location. From the table, we can see that the  
process for each node to reach its optimal location 
converges slowly. It takes the nodes 53 rounds to reach their 
close-to-optimal locations. Then, the nodes start to oscillate 
around their close-to-optimal locations and never stop. This 
kind of oscillation is caused by the round-off errors in 
computers. It wastes computation resources and will deplete 
the energy in nodes very quickly. 
The oscillation problem can be easily solved by setting a 
threshold δ (Jiang et al., 2007) such that if the difference 
between node ui’s target position ( )iL u  and the current 
position L(ui) is less than δ, the node does not have to move 
any more. 
To tackle the slow convergence problem without  
loosing the connectivity between communicating 
neighbours, we propose two mobility control protocols 
MCC and MCF. Both protocols use the optimal locations of 
the relay nodes calculated by MCM as a guide for nodes 
movement. 
4.2 Protocol MCC 
The first protocol MCC combines the ideas of MCM  
and MCD (details shown in Algorithm MCC). This protocol 
still uses the average calculation in MCD. The difference is 
that in MCD, a node will move as the locations of its left 
and right neighbours change. However, in MCC, a relay 
node knows its optimal position by MCM, and if the 
distance between its new position (which is calculated as the 
average of its two neighbours’ positions) and its optimal 
position is larger than the distance between its current 
position and its optimal position, it does not move. In this 
way, a node can avoid unnecessary movement. Therefore, 
the time it takes to complete the convergence process can be 
reduced. 
Note that the MCM part of the algorithm only needs  
to be called once if the locations of the source, the 
destination, and the label of each relay node do not change 
for a period of time. It is used here to calculate the optimal 
locations of relay nodes, not making them move 
immediately to those locations. So, it will not cause the 
disconnection problem. The actual movement is done in the 
loop part of MCC. The calling of MCM does not create 
much overhead because it can be incorporated into the 
routing process. When source s sends a message to d, it  
can also send its L(s) and its label 0 along with the  
message. Each intermediate node will do the same thing 
until the message reaches d. Then d sends an 
acknowledgment plus its L(d) back to s. When each relay 
node ui has L(s), L(d) and its label, it can calculate its 
optimal position. After nodes reach their optimal locations, 
according to Goldenberg et al. (2004), the subsequent 
routing energy consumption can be minimised. It can be 
proved that the connectivity of communicating neighbours 
is kept in MCC. 
Algorithm MCC: MCM combined with MCD. 
1: Apply MCM to obtain the optimal location L*(ui) for each 
intermediate node ui. 
2 repeat 
3  for each intermediate node ui at round t do 
4   Exchange the location Lt–1(ui) reached in the last 
round t – 1 with ui–1 and ui+1. 
5:   Receive Lt–1(ui–1) and Lt–1(ui+1). Set 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 .
2
t i t i
t i
L u L u
L u − − − +
+=  
6:   If |Lt(ui) – L*(ui)| < |Lt–1(ui) – L*(ui)| and  
|Lt(ui) – L*(ui)| > δ, then move to Lt(ui). 
7: end for 
8: until all nodes have no further movement. 
Figure 2 Illustration of Theorem 1 
u23
u1
u2
u3
2
u’3 u4
*
u
L
0
u’
1
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Table 1 The slow convergence process and oscillation of nodes to reach their optimal locations 
Round sx node1x node2x node3x node4x dx 
0 92.11134 86.99914 80.11193 74.99975 69.11155 63.99937 
1 92.11134 86.11163 80.99944 74.61174 69.49956 63.99937 
2 92.11134 86.55539 80.36169 75.24949 69.30556 63.99937 
3 92.11134 86.23651 80.90244 74.83362 69.62444 63.99937 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
53 92.11134 86.48894 80.86656 75.24416 69.62177 63.99937 
54 92.11134 86.48895 80.86655 74.24417 69.62176 63.99937 
55 92.11134 86.48894 80.86656 74.24416 69.62177 63.99937 
56 92.11134 86.48895 80.86655 74.24417 69.62176 63.99937 
57 92.11134 86.48894 80.86656 74.24416 69.62177 63.99937 
58 92.11134 86.48895 80.86655 74.24417 69.62176 63.99937 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
 
Theorem 1: Connectivity is kept between communicating 
neighbours in MCC. 
Proof: Without loss of generality, in our proof, we need to 
cover cases where a node will move with the location 
changes of its two neighbours and cases where a node will 
not move if the new location is farther away from its 
optimal location than its current location. To cover both 
cases, we come up with a network as shown in Figure 2. 
There are five relay nodes u0, u1, ⋅⋅⋅, u4. For convenience’s 
sake, the labels of the nodes are also used for their locations. 
A solid line between two nodes indicates that they can 
communicate with each other directly. An undirected 
dashed line is used to indicate the distance between them. 
And a directed line represents the movement of a node. 
MCM calculates the optimal locations of the relay 
nodes. In the figure, only the optimal location 1( )L
∗  of node 
u1 is shown. Node u1 is the one that will not move because 
its new location which is at the midpoint of u0 and u2 is 
farther away from its optimal location. All others will move 
to their new locations, that is, node u2 will move to 2u′  
which is the midpoint of u1 and u3, and node u3 to 3u′  which 
is at the middle of u2 and u4. 
Now, we want to prove that the connections of nodes in 
their new locations are not lost. That is, 1 2| |u u′−  and 
2 3| |u u′ ′−  are less or equal to the transmission range R. 
First, we prove that 1 2| |u u R′− ≤  is true. Obviously in 
triangle u1u2u3, either 1 2 1 2| | | |u u u u′− ≥ −  is true or 
2 3 2 3| | | |u u u u′− ≥ −  is true. Since 1 2 2 3| | | |,u u u u′ ′− = −   
|u1 – u2| ≤ R, and |u2 – u3| ≤ R are true, 1 2| |u u R′− ≤  is also 
true. 
Next, we prove that 2 3| |u u R′ ′− ≤  is true. Denote the 
midpoint of u2u3 as u23. 2 3 2 23 3 23| | | | | |u u u u u u′ ′ ′ ′− ≤ − + − =  
1 1
1 2 3 42 2(| | | |) ( ) .u u u u R R R− + − ≤ + =  So 2 3| |u u R′ ′− ≤  is 
true. 
Therefore, the connectivity is not lost in Algorithm 
MCC.   
4.3 Protocol MCF 
The second protocol MCF also uses MCM to obtain the 
optimal location for each relay node. The idea is that the 
relay nodes should move toward their optimal locations as 
much as possible without breaking the connections with 
their left and right neighbours. In this way, for each node, 
there is no extra movement. The details of this algorithm are 
shown in Algorithm MCF. 
Algorithm MCF: Move to optimal location as much as 
possible. 
1: Apply MCM to obtain the optimal location L*(ui) for each 
intermediate node ui. 
2: repeat 
3:  for each intermediate node ui at round t do 
4:   Calculate target location Lt(ui) which is the closest 
point to L*(ui) without breaking the connection with 
ui’s left and right neighbours ui–1 and ui+1. 
5:   If |Lt(ui) – L*(ui)| > δ, then move to Lt(ui). 
6:  end for 
7: until all nodes have no further movement. 
In MCF, the target location Lt(ui) in each round t can be 
easily calculated using a small program that solves 
mathematical equations. Theorem 2 shows that the 
connection between communicating neighbours is not lost 
in MCF. 
Theorem 2: Connectivity is kept between communicating 
neighbours in MCF. 
Proof: Without loss of generality, suppose there are four 
relay nodes u0, u1, u2, u3 (see Figure 3). The area covered by 
a node’s transmission range is represented by a dashed 
circle in the figure. A solid line between two nodes indicates 
that they can communicate with each other directly. An 
undirected dashed line is used to indicate the distance 
between them. And a directed line represents the movement 
of a node. Node u1 has neighbours u0 and u2 while node u2 
has neighbours u1 and u3. The optimal locations of nodes u1 
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and u2 are 1L
∗  and 2L
∗  respectively from MCM. Now, node 
u1 and node u2 will move toward their optimal locations as 
much as possible without loosing the contact with their 
neighbours. The new locations of nodes u1 and u2 are 1u′  
and 2u′  as shown in Figure 3. 
Now we want to show that the communication between 
nodes u1 and u2 in their new locations is not lost, that is, 
1 2| | .u u R′ ′− ≤  In Figure 3, in shape 1 2 2 1,u u u u′ ′  either 
1 2 1 2| | | |u u u u′ ′ ′− ≤ −  is true or 1 2 1 2| | | |u u u u′ ′ ′− ≤ −  is true. 
Since 1 2| |u u R′− ≤  and 1 2| |u u R′ − ≤  are true, so 
1 2| |u u R′ ′− ≤  is true. This means that the communication 
between nodes u1 and u2 in their new locations is still within 
the range R.   
Figure 3 Illustration of Theorem 2 
u1 u2
u
u’
u’
1
2
1
u
L* L*
0
2
3
 
5 Privacy preserving 
In this section, we introduce a unique security issue called 
sink location privacy in the proposed mobility control 
protocols, and put forward a privacy preserving scheme. 
5.1 Attacks on sink location 
Mobility control protocols are susceptible to various attacks. 
Many security schemes of authentication, encryption and 
key management proposed in the past can be deployed in 
WSNs to protect them. But this paper will not address 
traditional attacks. Rather, we show two attacks (direct 
attack and intersection attack) that can be hardly defeated 
by current security countermeasures. The two attacks give 
attackers an easy access to sink location without exposing 
themselves. Using the two attacking approaches, attackers 
do not need to physically trace along a path hop by hop to 
the real sink node, but simply monitor nearby traffic or 
capture a few nearby nodes at any place far away from the 
real sink. 
The direct attack exploits the fact that all mobility 
control protocols need to send the sink location information 
to the relay nodes. This is because MCC and MCF use 
MCM where the sink node d includes its location L(d) in the 
reply message when it sends acknowledgment back to the 
source node s. After the reply reaches s, all the intermediate 
nodes on the path will have the location information of d. 
Apparently, an attacker can obtain the location of the sink 
node d by compromising any node along the path and then 
destroy the sink. Therefore, a privacy preserving approach is 
needed to hide the sink location. 
The intersection attack exploits the geometric 
characteristic of paths formed in mobility control. Because 
the sink node places itself on the paths, attackers can infer 
the actual sink location by locating nearby nodes in  
two disjoint paths. This intersection attack is illustrated in 
Figure 4, in which the sink is communicating with two 
sources s1 and s2 via two disjoint paths. If an attacker can 
find any two nodes on each of the two disjoint paths, the 
attacker can obtain the two paths going through these nodes. 
Then, the intersection of the two paths discloses the location 
of the sink node. This attack allows attackers to obtain sink 
location without cracking any packet of mobility control 
protocols. 
The challenge of defeating the two attacks and ensuring 
the privacy of sink location is that traditional security 
mechanisms cannot hide the sink location information. For 
example, encryption of the sink location cannot prevent a 
fully compromised node from disclosing the information 
because an attacker can easily obtain all credentials (such as 
keys) in the compromised node to decrypt any encrypted 
information. 
Sink location anonymity is different from identity 
anonymity where attackers can eavesdrop packets 
transmitted near them and find the identity information of 
the sink node (such as its IP address). But this kind of 
information cannot help the attackers to locate the sink 
node. In this paper, we are concerned with the attacks that 
attempt to discover the location of the sink node and destroy 
it. Hence, the objective of our work is to hide the sink 
location. 
Figure 4 Intersection attack 
s1
d
s2
 
5.2 Dummy node 
Our basic idea is to use a dummy node d ′  to hide the real 
sink location information L(d) from all the nodes on the 
path. Assume a sink node d is communicating with several 
sources through multiple disjoint paths. After d receives the 
source location L(s) from each source, it does not reply with 
its real location L(d). Instead, the sink node picks a one hop 
neighbouring node h and a dummy node d ′  for each  
path such that h satisfies inequality (2) and d ′  satisfies 
equation (3), where nx is the hop count of node x from the 
source s and |L(x) – L(y)| is the distance between nodes x 
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and y. Inequality (2) states that h’s best location is in the 
communication range R of d so that d is one hop away from 
the path that goes through s and h. Equation (3) states that 
,d ′  h and s are on the same path. 
( ) ( )L h L d R− <  (2) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
d h
L d L s L h L s
n n′
′ − −=  (3) 
The idea of dummy node is illustrated in Figure 5, where d 
communicates with two sources s1 and s2 via its neighbours 
h1 and h2. Assume d has obtained s1’s location L(s1),  
h1’s location L(h1), and the hop count 1hn  between s1 and  
h1. To hide its true location from s1, d picks a  
random number 
1 1d hn n′   and computes the location 
1
1
1 1 1 1( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( )
d
h
n
nL d L h L s L s
′′ = − +  according to equation (3). 
Then, d claims a dummy sink d ′  at 1( )L d ′  on the path and 
1dn ′  is the hop count between s1 and 1.d ′  
Accordingly, d can make two dummy nodes for the  
two disjoint paths as shown in Figure 5. d selects h1 and 1d ′  
for s1, and h2 and 2d ′  for s2. Although d is not on either path, 
d claims that it is the next hop to hi on the path. Hence, 
when h1 receives a packet from s1, it will forward the packet 
to its next hop which is d. h2 will do the same thing after 
receiving a message. Thereby, d can get information 
delivered in both paths while using the dummy nodes to 
counteract the direct and the intersection attacks on its 
location. 
Figure 5 Dummy nodes 
s1
h1
d
d´1
s2
h2
d´2
...
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...´
 
Property 1: The dummy node does not disclose the real 
 sink location if any mobile sensor node on a path is 
compromised. 
Proof: Any sensor ui on a path between a source s  
and a dummy sink d ′  knows the locations of them. 
Compromising ui, attackers can obtain the path equation  
as ( ) ,s d
s d
Y Y
s sX Xy x X Y
′
′
−
−= − +  where Xx and Yx are the 
coordinates of node x. Since the sink node is off the path, its 
location does not satisfy the path equation. Therefore, the 
path equation does not disclose the sink location.   
Property 2: The dummy node does not disclose the sink 
location if the intersection points of any two disjoint paths is 
compromised. 
Proof: Assume that two disjoint paths intersect at point x. x 
must satisfy the path equations of the two disjoint paths. 
Because the sink node is off both paths, the sink node does 
not satisfy the path equation of either path. Therefore, the 
intersection point x does not disclose the sink location.   
5.3 Φ-anonymity 
In this section, we propose a formal privacy model to 
analyse the achieved privacy. The model defines a proximity 
area surrounding the real sink node, which shows the range 
of the sink location that attackers can derive. The model can 
help the sink node to compare the privacy when different 
dummy nodes are selected. 
As shown in Figure 6, we place the sink node at the 
origin. Assume that attackers have found N disjoint paths. 
Each path equation i is denoted as y = kix + ci, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N. 
Because all these paths pass inside the communication 
range R of the sink node, the vertical distance from the 
origin to any path is less than R. Hence, it must be true that 
2
| |
1
.i
i
c
k
R
+
<  
Similarly, in order to determine whether the sink node is 
at the location (X, Y) or not, attackers need to compute the 
vertical distance from the location (X, Y) to each path i using 
2
| |
1
.i i
i
c k X Y
i k
d + −
+
=  If all di satisfy inequality (4), i.e., the 
distance from the location (X, Y) to any of the disjoint paths 
is less than the communication range R, a sink node might 
be at the location (X, Y). 
Figure 6 Illustration of ΦP-anonymity 
s1
s2
d'2
d'1
Y
X
d
(0,0)
R
ΦP
 
2
  1
1
i i
i
c k X Y
R for i N
k
+ − < ≤ ≤
+
 (4) 
In the example of Figure 6, the proximity area is the 
shadowed area in which any position (X, Y) satisfies 
inequality (4). Note that the proximity area covers the 
locations of possible sinks that are more than one hop away 
from the real sink node. As long as a location is within the 
communication range of either of the two disjoint paths, the 
location can be considered as the sink location. Hence, the 
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proximity area is the achieved privacy against the two 
compromised paths. 
Given such a proximity area, we define Φ-anonymity 
below. Accordingly, the proximity area in Figure 6 is a  
ΦP-anonymity, where P is the set of the two disjoint paths. 
Definition 5.1: Let Φ be a proximity area and P be the set of 
all disjoint paths known to attackers. Φ is said to satisfy  
ΦP-anonymity if and only if Φ is the maximum proximity 
area in which any location (X, Y) satisfies inequality (4) for 
all paths in P. 
Definition 5.2: Let Φ be a proximity area and P∗ be the set 
of all disjoint paths known to the sink node. Φ is said to 
satisfy Φ-anonymity if and only if Φ is the maximum 
proximity area in which any location (X, Y) satisfies 
inequality (4) for all paths in P∗. 
The relation of ΦP-anonymity and Φ-anonymity is shown by 
Theorem 3 which indicates that attackers can reduce the 
proximity area if more disjoint paths are known. The 
smaller the proximity area is, the better estimation the 
attackers can have on the real sink location. However, the 
minimum proximity area that attackers can achieve is the  
Φ-anonymity area. 
Theorem 3: A Φ-anonymity area is the minimum in all  
ΦP-anonymity areas, i.e., ∀ΦP, Φ ⊆ ΦP. 
Proof: Assume we can find a P and a ΦP such that 
.PΦ ⊆ Φ/  Thereby, a location x exists that x ∈ Φ but  
x ∉ ΦP. Hence, the location x is one hop away from all paths 
in P∗. However, a path p ∈ P exists that x is more than one 
hop away from p. Therefore, p ∉ P∗ and thus .P P∗⊆/  
However, because P is the set of all disjoint paths 
known to attackers and P∗ is the set of all disjoint paths 
known to the sink node, we know P ⊆ P∗, which 
contradicts .P P∗⊆/  Therefore, the theorem is proved by 
contradiction.   
5.4 Sink-anonymity scheme 
The Φ-anonymity area is critical to the privacy of sink 
location given multiple paths. The larger the Φ-anonymity 
area is, the better the real sink node is protected. According 
to Definition 5.2, the shape and the size of the Φ-anonymity 
are determined by P∗. In other words, the disjoint paths 
selected by the sink node determine the privacy of the sink 
location. 
We propose two SASs (shown in Algorithms R-SAS 
and O-SAS). R-SAS uses the random disjoint path selection 
approach, while O-SAS uses the offset disjoint path 
selection approach. By analysis and comparison, we show 
that only O-SAS can preserve privacy given multiple paths. 
And that is the one that will be embedded into our mobility 
control protocols later. 
Figure 7 Sink coverage and path selection approaches, (a) 45° (b) 180° 
 
(a) (b) 
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To discuss the two schemes, we first model the  
area covered by a sink node as a ‘fan area’, i.e., all sensor 
nodes in the fan area report data to the sink node. Denote 
the angle of the fan as θ. Figure 7 illustrates the fans of  
θ = 45° and θ = 180° (the grey areas). When θ = 180°, paths 
to the sink node may come from all directions. Thereby, 
paths in a fan of θ > 180° are the same as paths in a fan of  
θ = 180°. Note that the fan area of a sink node is normally 
determined by network deployment or task assignment. We 
assume the sink node has θ as a parameter in mobility 
control. 
R-SAS makes each selected path go through a randomly 
positioned one hop neighbour and a randomly selected 
dummy sink. O-SAS does the same thing, and, in  
addition, makes all selected paths intersect at an offset  
point x (the black dots in the bottom row in Figure 7). 
Hence, in addition to equation (3) and inequality (2),  
all the paths selected by the offset approach also  
satisfy equation (5) which states that the offset point x is on 
the paths. Note that x is neither a dummy node nor a real 
node. 
Algorithm R-SAS: Random sink-anonymity scheme. 
1: for each requesting sensor s do 
2:  The sink node selects a neighbour h and a dummy sink 
d ′  such that 
  (a) h satisfies inequality (2), 
  (b) d ′  satisfies equation (3). 
3: end for 
 
Algorithm O-SAS: Offset sink-anonymity scheme 
1: The sink picks an offset point x in the offset area and 
keeps the offset from x to d as a secret. 
2: for each requesting sensor s do 
3:  The sink node selects a neighbour h and a dummy sink 
d ′ such that 
  (a) h satisfies inequality (2) and equation (5), 
  (b) d ′  satisfies equation (3). 
4: end for 
x s h s
x s h s
Y Y Y Y
X X X X
− −=− −  (5) 
Figure 7 shows examples of the ΦP-anonymity area (the 
dotted areas) when attackers know a set P of five disjoint 
paths. The dotted areas illustrate several privacy properties. 
First, the actual sink node could be at any location within 
the dotted area. Knowing the area does not necessarily 
disclose the sink location. Second, the intersection of any 
paths does not disclose the sink location. When a sink node 
uses the offset selection method, the sink node can pick an 
offset point in any direction to hide itself. Hence, the offset 
point contributes no more information than the dotted area 
to attackers. 
5.5 Privacy analysis of R-SAS and O-SAS 
To analyse the privacy achieved by R-SAS and OSAS, we 
need to identify the Φ-anonymity areas in the proposed 
schemes. Theorem 4 shows that R-SAS does not provide 
any privacy protection to the real sink node if attackers 
compromise sensors in sufficient disjoint paths. On the 
contrary, Theorem 5 shows that O-SAS can achieve  
Φ-anonymity to protect the sink location. 
Theorem 4: Given multiple disjoint paths, the Φ-anonymity 
area of R-SAS could be as small as the real sink node and 
thus reveal the real sink location. 
Proof: Because the sink node randomly selects dummy 
nodes, it can possibly select two pairs of parallel paths 
1 1{ , }p p′  and 2 2{ , }p p′  as shown in Figure 8(a). From there, 
let P be the set of 1 1 2 2{ , , , }.p p p p′ ′  Then, the sink node is 
the only location that is in one hop to all paths in P. Hence, 
ΦP includes only the sink node. Because Φ ⊆ ΦP as in 
Theorem 3, Φ includes only the sink node.   
Theorem 5: Let p1 and p2 be the two outmost paths in  
O-SAS as shown in Figure 8(b) such that all paths in P∗ are 
bounded by the two paths. The Φ-anonymity area of O-SAS 
is the gray area in Figure 8(b) and does not reveal the real 
sink location. 
Proof: For any pi ∈ P∗, let Pi = {pi}. Find two parallel lines 
lt,i and lb,i as in Figure 8(b) such that any point within the 
two lines is one hop away from pi. Then, the area within the 
two lines is the -anonymity
iPΦ  area. 
We rotate pi from p1 to p2. For each instance of pi,  
we find the corresponding -anonymity
iPΦ  area. The 
overlapping area of all the -anonymity
iPΦ  areas, which is 
the grey area in Figure 8(b), is the Φ-anonymity area. 
For O-SAS, the solid grey area in Figure 9 shows  
where the sink node can select an offset point x. The  
dotted area is where sensors are deployed. The farthest 
distance between the offset point and the sink node is 
sin( /2) .
R
θ  If θ ≤ 60°, the offset point could be more than  
two hops away from the real sink node, while any selected 
path passing the offset point is one hop away from the real 
sink node.   
Figure 8 Analysis of Φ-anonymity, (a) R-SAS (b) O-SAS 
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Figure 9 Offset area 
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5.6 Comparison of R-SAS and O-SAS 
We use three metrics to quantitatively measure  
the Φ-anonymity of R-SAS and O-SAS: average  
distance ( , ) ,X Ype D dXdYΦ
= ∫  maximum distance  
pm = max(X, Y)∈Φ(D(X, Y)) and area 1 ,p dXdYΦ
= ∫  where 
D(X, Y) is the distance of the location (X, Y) to the real sink 
node. 
Algorithm SAMCC: Sink-anonymity MCC. 
1: The sink node d picks a dummy sink d ′  for each source 
s according to O-SAS. 
2: d sends the location ( )L d ′  back to s via its neighbour h. 
3: Apply MCM to obtain the optimal location L∗(ui) for 
each intermediate node ui. 
4: repeat 
5:  for each intermediate node ui at round t do 
6:   Exchange the location Lt–1(ui) reached in the last 
round t – 1 with ui–1 and ui+1. 
7:   Receive Lt–1(ui–1) and Lt–1(ui+1). Set 
1 1 1 1( ) ( )
2( ) .
t i t iL u L u
t iL u − − − +
+=  
8:   If |Lt(ui) – L∗(ui)| < |Lt–1(ui) – L∗(ui)| and |Lt(ui) – 
L∗(ui)| > δ, then move to Lt(ui). 
9:  end for 
10: until all nodes have no further movement. 
pe basically tells how far away the centre of the  
Φ-anonymity area is to the sink node in average. pm 
indicates the possible farthest location to the sink node. pa 
shows the size of the area where the sink node is. Therefore, 
from a defender’s perspective, the larger the pe, pm and pa, 
the better the privacy. 
Figure 10 depicts the measurement of privacy in three 
metrics. We study three situations, setting θ to 45°, 90° or 
180°. We assume that the sink node has a few disjoint paths 
ranging from 3 to 19 in its covered area. The results are 
normalised as the communication range of the sink node is 
set to 1. All data points are averaged over 30 random 
scenarios generated in MATLAB. 
First, the simulation confirms the privacy analysis of  
R-SAS and O-SAS. O-SAS provides much better privacy 
than R-SAS. As attackers obtain more disjoint paths, R-SAS 
in fact reduces the area where the sink node could be. For 
example, the area inferred from 19-disjoint paths in R-SAS 
is only about 4.5% of the area inferred from three disjoint 
paths. Thereby, attackers can estimate a very close location 
to the sink if they can find sufficient disjoint paths. In 
contrast, when O-SAS is used, the inferred area size reaches 
a boundary and cannot be further reduced as the number of 
disjoint paths increases. In other words, attackers cannot 
obtain the exact sink location by continuously trying more 
disjoint paths if O-SAS is applied. 
Second, we observe that smaller θ implies better privacy 
to the sink node. When the sink node collects information 
from a smaller fan area, disjoint paths lay more parallel to 
each other. Their one hop surrounding areas thus have a 
larger overlap, which results in a larger Φ-anonymity area 
that attackers can infer. Thus, the sink node is better 
protected with a smaller θ. This observation gives guidance 
to network deployment with mobility control. A sink node 
is better deployed at the boundary of a network than at the 
centre. A sink node is better assigned to monitor a part of 
the network than the whole network. 
Figure 10 Comparison of Φ-anonymity of R-SAS and O-SAS 
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6 Sink-anonymity mobility control protocols 
In this section, we apply the O-SAS scheme to two mobility 
control protocols, MCC and MCF, and develop two new 
sink-anonymity mobility control protocols, SAMCC and 
SAMCF, that protect the real sink node and ensure the 
connectivity between communicating neighbours. We also 
apply the O-SAS scheme to MCM and MCD. They will be 
used in our simulation for comparison. 
6.1 Protocol SAMCC 
In SAMCC, the sink node d picks a dummy sink d ′  
according to O-SAS for the intermediate nodes to adjust 
their locations. An intermediate node knows its optimal 
position using MCM. If the distance between its new 
position (which is calculated as the average of its  
two neighbours’ positions) and its optimal position is larger 
than the distance between its current position and its optimal 
position, it does not move. In this way, a node can avoid 
unnecessary movement. 
For a particular source s, once a dummy node d ′  is set, 
all the real intermediate nodes between the source and the 
dummy sink will move to their optimal locations. SAMCC 
will not disconnect communicating neighbours during the 
process. The complete algorithm is shown in Algorithm 
SAMCC. 
Algorithm SAMCF: Sink-anonymity MCF. 
1: The sink node d picks a dummy sink d ′  for each source s 
according to O-SAS. 
2: d sends the location ( )L d ′  back to s via its neighbour h. 
3: Apply MCM to obtain the optimal location L∗(ui) for each 
intermediate node ui. 
4: repeat 
5:  for each intermediate node ui at round t do 
6:   Calculate target location Lt(ui) which is the closest 
point to L∗(ui) without breaking the connection with 
ui’s left and right neighbours ui–1 and ui+1. 
7:   If |Lt(ui) – L∗(ui)| > δ, then move to Lt(ui). 
8:  end for 
9: until all nodes have no further movement. 
6.2 Protocol SAMCF 
The second protocol, SAMCF, selects a dummy sink as in 
SAMCC. Once a dummy sink is chosen, the intermediate 
nodes will move toward their optimal locations as much as 
possible without breaking the connections with their left and 
right neighbours. The details of this algorithm are shown in 
Algorithm SAMCF. 
As said in its protocol, SAMCF will not disrupt the 
communication between neighbours when the intermediate 
nodes are moving to their optimal locations once a dummy 
node d ′  is set for each source s. 
6.3 Protocols SAMCM and SAMCD 
When O-SAS is applied to MCM or MCD, the real sink 
selects a dummy sink like the previous two protocols, and 
then the intermediate nodes will move according to MCM 
or MCD. SAMCM cannot guarantee the connectivity 
between communicating neighbours, and SAMCD has a 
slow convergence process. The oscillation problem in MCD 
is still solved by a threshold δ. They are included here for 
comparison in the next section. 
7 Simulation and performance analysis 
7.1 Simulation settings 
We implement the sink-anonymity mobility control 
protocols (SAMCC, SAMCF, SAMCM and SAMCD) using 
a self-implemented simulator written in C language. In this 
paper, we focus on the mobility control model that is not 
affected by traffic patterns and throughput. Instead of using 
simulators such as NS2 and Omnet++, our simulator is 
sufficient for conducting experiments and obtaining results. 
We conduct experiments using various network settings 
with different parameters. The initial locations of nodes are 
randomly generated in a 100 × 100 area. The number of 
nodes is set to 5, 10, 15 or 20, including the source and the 
destination. The communication range R is 20 or 40  
(Wu et al., 2006). The performance measurements are 
averaged over 10,000 experiments. 
The performance of these protocols is measured by three 
metrics: convergence speed, energy consumption in node 
movement, and the communication cost. The convergence 
speed is obtained by the number of rounds of node 
movement needed to achieve stabilisation. The energy 
consumption in node movement is measured as the total 
moving distance of nodes. The communication cost of 
mobility control is calculated by the total number of 
messages exchanged between nodes. 
7.1.1 Simulation results on convergence 
Figure 11(a) and Figure 11(e) show the number of rounds of 
node movement for different algorithms when the 
communication range is set to 20 or 40 respectively with 
various node numbers. In the figures, SAMCD has the most 
rounds of node movement, SAMCC has less, SAMCF and 
SAMCM have the least. SAMCM has the fastest 
convergence because it allows nodes to move to their 
optimal locations in one round. In both figures, we can see 
that the curves of SAMCF almost overlap with those of 
SAMCM. This shows that SAMCF can converge 
surprisingly fast. It almost reaches the optimal result of 
SAMCM. 
 
 
 Fast mobility control protocols with sink location protection in wireless sensor networks 15 
Figure 11 Comparison of sink-anonymity mobility control protocols, (a) round # of node movement (R = 20) (b) total node moving dist.  
(R = 20) (c) comm. cost (R = 20) (d) increased comm. cost (%) (R = 20) (e) round # of node movement (R = 40) (f) total node 
moving dist. (R = 40) (g) comm. cost (R = 40) (h) increased comm. cost (%) (R = 40) 
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7.1.2 Simulation results on total moving distance 
Figure 11(b) and Figure 11(f) show the total moving 
distance of nodes during the convergence process using 
different algorithms when the communication range is 20 or 
40 respectively with various node numbers. The results in 
these two figures match those of the number of rounds of 
node movement. One good result is that SAMCF is so close 
to SAMCM in terms of total moving distance that their 
curves are almost overlapped in the figures. As we know, 
SAMCM achieves the minimum total movement. Therefore, 
the total movement using SAMCF is extremely close to the 
minimum. 
7.1.3 Simulation results on communication cost 
Now, we look at the communication cost of these protocols. 
As shown in Figure 11(c) and Figure 11(g), the results of 
the communication cost match those of the number of 
rounds and total distance of node movement. SAMCD has 
the highest cost, SAMCC is the next, and SAMCF is very 
close to SAMCM which has the lowest cost. 
In summary, these results show how good  
SAMCC and SAMCF are compared with SAMCM and 
SAMCD in convergence speed, energy consumption, and 
communication cost. This is especially true for SAMCF, 
which nearly reaches the best results of SAMCM. 
7.2 Effects of embedding O-SAS in protocols 
In this section, we show how the added security scheme  
O-SAS affects the convergence speed, total node moving 
distance and communication cost of the original protocols. 
First, the convergence speed. When O-SAS is integrated 
into MCD, MCM, MCC and MCF, the resulting  
sink-anonymity mobility control protocols SAMCD, 
SAMCM, SAMCC and SAMCF will have the same 
convergence speed as the underlying protocols. This is 
because after a dummy sink is selected according to SAS, 
the intermediate nodes between the source and the sink will 
try to align themselves based on the position of the dummy 
sink. This process is no different in terms of number of 
rounds of node movement than using the real sink. So, 
adding security in these protocols does not affect the 
convergence property of them. 
Second, the total moving distance. Similar to the 
convergence speed, built-in O-SAS has little impact on the 
total distance of node movement either. 
Third, the communication cost. If O-SAS is integrated 
into MCD, MCM, MCF and MCC, the communication cost 
will increase as a result of extra message exchanges. We 
calculate the increased communication cost (in percentage) 
over each original protocol if security is embedded. From 
Figure 11(d) and Figure 11(h), the communication cost 
increases for all four protocols if security is used. The 
communication cost of SAMCM increases the most: e.g., 
25% when the number of nodes is 5 and the communication 
range is 20; SAMCF is the next; SAMCC and SAMCD are 
the least. Since MCM and MCF are already low-cost 
protocols, anything added on to them will cause a greater 
increase in cost than those higher-cost protocols. As the 
number of nodes increases, the percentages fall sharply. 
Therefore, the built-in security will only bring trivial 
communication cost to the original protocols. 
8 Conclusions 
In this paper, two mobility control protocols with fast 
convergence, MCC and MCF, have been put forward to 
improve communication in WSNs. MCC speeds-up the 
convergence process by avoiding node’s overreaction to the 
movement of its neighbours, whereas MCF reduces the 
convergence time by moving the nodes as close to their 
optimal positions as possible. Both protocols have 
embedded the information of the optimal locations of relay 
nodes into the mobility control. In addition, we have  
pointed out a unique privacy issue: the sink location 
privacy. To protect the sink node, we have proposed a  
new privacy-preserving scheme to free mobility control 
protocols from attacks that locate and sabotage the sink 
node. The privacy-preserving scheme obfuscates the sink 
location with dummy sink nodes. Analysis has shown that 
the scheme can effectively hide the sink location via 
anonymity. The scheme has also been integrated into the 
mobility control protocols without raising much additional 
overhead. The simulation and performance analysis have 
shown that the proposed privacy-preserving mobility  
control protocols, with the sink node well-protected, can 
reach near-optimal results in terms of convergence speed, 
energy consumption and the communication cost. All of 
these provide strong evidence of support in justifying  
the effectiveness of using mobility control to reduce  
energy-consumption to improve communication efficiency 
in WSNs. In the future, we will extend this work to enhance 
sink privacy with multiple path segments in mobility 
control. That is, there can be communications between one 
source and multiple destinations or between multiple 
sources and multiple destinations. The solutions involve 
resource sharing and competition. Another direction in the 
future is to apply our model to real applications by 
considering traffic and throughput in the network and verify 
the performance by NS2 or Omnet++. 
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